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Abstract 
There are two widely accepted explanations of why politically-motivated governments make trade 
agreements. There is an informal explanation, which I shall call the "practitioners' story", even though 
it is most economists' informal view as well. And there is a formal explanation in the economics 
literature, which I shall call the "standard model", referring to the basic structure shared by the 
Bagwell-Staiger and Grossman-Helpman models. Unfortunately, the practitioners’ story and the 
standard model contradict each other at every crucial point. For example, in the practitioners' story, 
trade agreements are about reducing politically-motivated protectionism; and getting an agreement 
depends on political support from exporters. But in the standard model, trade agreements never reduce 
such protectionism; and politics plays no role in securing an agreement. This paper expounds the 
contradictions between the practitioners' story and the standard model, which have gone largely 
unremarked. It refutes suggestions by defenders of the standard model that the contradictions are 
illusory. It identifies the different assumptions made by the two explanations that generate the 
contradictions. It gives reasons for skepticism about the standard model. And it discusses why all of 
this matters. 
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1. Introduction* 
Here is a conundrum. The best-established economic model of trade agreements (specifically, the core 
structure shared by the Bagwell-Staiger model
1
 and the Grossman-Helpman model
2
) is fundamentally 
and completely inconsistent with most trade practitioners’ understanding of trade agreements. Indeed, 
it is inconsistent with most economists’ informal understanding of trade agreements. And almost no 
one seems to notice, or to regard this situation as worthy of discussion. 
I wrote a paper some years ago in which I expressed skepticism about the Bagwell-Staiger model, 
mainly on the ground that it could not explain actual trade agreements.
3
 But I did not appreciate then 
the depth of the contradiction between the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model and what I 
shall call the “practitioners’ story”, the informal story of how trade agreements come about that is told 
by practitioners and economists alike. There is nothing in the literature that fully explores the 
contradictions between the best-established formal model of trade agreements and almost everyone’s 
informal view. 
I will describe the mechanisms of the practitioners’ story and the Bagwell- Staiger/Grossman-
Helpman model in section 2, but the core contradictions they generate are easily stated. First, and 
crucially, in the practitioners’ story, governments make trade agreements to reduce protectionism. But 
in the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model, trade agreements will never reduce protectionism 
as we normally understand it. This leads to a further contradiction. In the practitioners’ story, getting a 
trade agreement requires mobilizing political support for the agreement from export interests. But in 
the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model, politics plays no role in explaining why we get an 
agreement. 
It is a remarkable proposition, that in the best-established model, trade agreements never reduce 
protectionism. Some readers may suspect I am relying on an idiosyncratic notion of “protectionism”. 
But what I mean by “protectionism” is exactly what we all commonly mean in this context. 
Protectionism is unilateral trade policy that restricts imports in order to get political support for the 
government from import-competing producers.
4
 Most of us think trade agreements are primarily about 
restraining protectionism in this sense. But in the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model, trade 
agreements never reduce protectionism in this sense. The sole function of trade agreements in the 
Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model is to eliminate terms-of-trade manipulation, unilateral 
trade policy that aims at improving the home country’s terms of trade. Terms-of-trade manipulation is 
a completely distinct phenomenon from protectionism, reflecting a different governmental motivation. 
Protectionism aims to affect domestic relative prices, in response to special-interest politics; terms-of-
trade manipulation aims to affect world prices, to increase national income.  
                                                     
*
 © Donald H. Regan, 2014. Forthcoming in World Trade Review (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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 Bagwell and Staiger (1999), (2002). 
2
 Grossman and Helpman (1995). 
3
 Regan (2006). 
4
 Incidentally, although we do not usually bother to specify what the import-competing producers are lobbying for, we 
usually assume implicitly that they are lobbying for protection against foreign competition in order to increase their 
producer surplus. I mention this because in the Bagwell-Staiger model producers may, and in the Grossman-Helpman 
model producers will, lobby also over their share of distributed tariff revenue and their consumer surplus. I shall suppress 
further mention of these possibilities, which are hardly ever mentioned outside the Grossman-Helpman model; this will 
simplify the exposition without changing the conclusions. (This means I am speaking loosely when I say below that 
Grossman and Helpman’s “political support” terms, or Bagwell and Staiger’s “politically optimal tariffs”, represent the 
protectionist component of the unilateral tariff. Strictly speaking, they represent the government’s response to lobbying 
over domestic prices. This includes protectionism, but it also includes the government’s response to lobbying by producer 
groups over their consumer surplus, if any.)  
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I cannot emphasize too strongly that the distinction between protectionism and terms-of-trade 
manipulation is a matter of the government’s motivation, not the tariff’s effects. Appreciating this 
point is crucial to understanding the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model. As I shall explain 
below, both the Bagwell-Staiger model and the Grossman-Helpman model distinguish explicitly 
between the political motive for tariffs and the terms-of-trade motive. And in both models, a trade 
agreement will eliminate only tariffs (or the portions of tariffs) that are motivated by terms-of-trade 
considerations; the agreement will not reduce tariffs (or the portions of tariffs) that are motivated by 
politics. Consider a tariff imposed by a large country on a good that is also produced domestically. 
This tariff will have both a protective effect for the import-competing industry and a terms-of-trade 
effect. But whether the tariff is protectionism, or terms-of-trade manipulation, or both, depends on 
whether the government is aiming at the protective effect, or at the terms-of-trade effect, or both. And 
in the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model, how far a trade agreement will reduce the tariff 
varies according to the motivation.  
For convenience, I shall hereafter refer to the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model as the 
“standard model”. Some people have objected that my real target is just the Bagwell-Staiger model, 
and that the Grossman-Helpman model allows trade agreements that reduce protectionism. We shall 
see that that is not true. Grossman and Helpman do not call attention to the paradoxical consequences 
of their model, as Bagwell and Staiger do; and it may seem hard to believe that a model of trade 
agreements that includes a detailed micro-politics of protectionism could not allow trade agreements 
to reduce protectionism. But that is what the model says. So far as trade agreements are concerned, the 
core structure of the Grossman-Helpman model is the same as the core structure of the Bagwell-
Staiger model.  
Other people have objected to my calling the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model the 
“standard model”, on the ground that there are other models out there, such as commitment models.5 
Commitment models may explain some trade agreements, but they cannot explain agreements like the 
WTO. In the commitment models, the government commits itself by a trade agreement in order to 
forestall choices by domestic investors that would lead the government to adopt ex post a protectionist 
policy it does not want ex ante. But such models cannot explain how a trade agreement can reduce 
tariffs that are already in place. Nor do they capture the importance of reciprocity in trade agreements. 
Indeed, the commitment models do not even involve the kind of “commitment” that probably has most 
practical significance in the real world. In the commitment models, the “audience” for the commitment 
is domestic investors, and the government’s fundamental preferences are stable. But in the real world, 
most governments that seek commitment by trade agreements are trying to advertise their 
liberalization to the world, or to tie the hands of future governments with less liberal fundamental 
preferences.  
Finally, some economists have objected to my calling the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman 
model the “standard model” on the ground that they do not accept it. But if some economists do not 
accept the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model, there are many who do (or who say they do – 
some people claim to accept the model, but also tell the practitioners’ story when talking informally). 
There is no other model with remotely the same presence in the literature as the Bagwell-
Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model, nor with the same degree of (nominal) acceptance. So I shall call 
the Bagwell-Staiger/Grossman-Helpman model the “standard model” for lack of a better name; I hope 
readers who reject the model will be mollified by this acknowledgment. I also hope some of them will 
take the phrase as a challenge to displace the current “standard model” with something better.  
Here is the program for the rest of the paper. In section 2, I begin by presenting the practitioners’ 
story, the informal story that most of us (when thinking informally) regard as explaining trade 
agreements. I then sketch intuitively the workings of the standard model. And I explore the 
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contradictions between the practitioners’ story and the standard model. In section 3, I discuss (and 
reject) some arguments offered by defenders of the standard model to show that the practitioners’ 
story is just a particular case under the standard model; or to show that somehow the standard model 
can allow trade agreements that reduce protectionism after all. In section 4, I explain how the different 
results in the practitioners’ story and the standard model flow from different assumptions about how 
domestic trade politics works; and I criticize as unrealistic the assumptions of the standard model. In 
section 5, I discuss additional reasons why the standard model cannot explain the trade agreements we 
see in the real world. Section 6 concludes by discussing why all this matters.  
Some preliminary remarks about why it matters may clarify my claims. Even though trade 
agreements in the practitioners’ story reduce protectionism, I am not suggesting that the practitioners’ 
story describes a guaranteed high road to reducing protectionism. The practitioners’ story makes 
specific assumptions about how domestic trade politics works, and the standard model makes different 
assumptions. Trade negotiators should accept, and act on, whichever account is true. If the 
assumptions of the standard model are true, then the mechanism of the practitioners’ story is not 
available, and effort spent trying to negotiate an agreement that reduces protectionism will be wasted. 
But conversely, if the assumptions of the practitioners’ story are true, or truer (as I think they are), 
then trade negotiators who accept the standard model, and hence make no attempt to reduce 
protectionism, will be missing an important opportunity. Some readers may think that whatever 
difference there is between the practitioners’ story and the standard model cannot matter in the end, 
because the terms of the eventual agreement should depend only on which producer groups lobby over 
the agreement, and with what force. I agree that if the same political forces are active in both accounts 
when an agreement is being negotiated, then we should get the same agreement in both accounts. But 
it still matters which account is true. The reason (elaborated in section 4) is that in the practitioners’ 
story, but not in the standard model, the mere fact that the governments are looking for an agreement 
changes the balance of political forces.  
2. The Practitioners’ Story, the Standard Model, and the Contradictions 
In the practitioners’ story, governments acting unilaterally impose tariffs in order to get political 
support from import-competing producers who want protection from foreign competition. These 
protectionist tariffs cause deadweight losses in the home country, but the political benefit to the 
government outweighs those losses. But these same governments can then benefit, in many cases, 
from a trade agreement that reciprocally reduces such tariffs. Each government loses political support 
from its import-competing producers when it lowers its own tariff; but it can replace that lost support 
with support from its exporters, who benefit from the reduction of the foreign tariff. The new support 
from exporters may fully replace the lost support from import-competing producers, but it need not. 
Lowering the tariffs reduces the domestic deadweight losses that the tariffs cause. So as long as the 
exporter support in each country comes sufficiently close to replacing the lost support from import-
competing producers, both governments can be made better off.  
This utterly familiar story is told not just by trade lawyers and trade officials, but also by trade-
focused political scientists, and by many international economists when arguing informally.
6
 Despite 
this broad acceptance, there is no generally accepted formal model of the practitioners’ story. There 
are genuine difficulties in constructing a model, although I shall not start discussing details of a 
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 Precisely because this story is so deeply rooted in the conventional understanding of trade agreements, it is not easy to 
find completely clear statements. One particularly nice statement is Pauwelyn (2008), pp. 559-560. Pauwelyn thinks we 
need a new model for future trade negotiations, but he does not doubt that the practitioners’ story captures the core 
dynamic of trade negotiations past and present. The story is also told telegraphically in, e.g., Hudec (1993), pp. 314-316; 
Destler (2005), pp. 17, 253-254 (like Pauwelyn, Destler suggests that changing patterns of trade and the emergence of 
“trade and” issues may be reducing the relevance of the practitioners’ story, but certainly not in favor of the standard 
model); Krugman (1997), p. 118; Hoekman and Kostecki (2001), pp. 27-28, 32-33. 
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model-building project I cannot complete. Wilfred Ethier has developed a model in which trade 
agreements reduce protectionism, which I discuss briefly in section 4.
7
 But it is not clear that Ethier’s 
model captures the practitioners’ story; and Ethier himself is not fully satisfied with his model. 
(Incidentally, Ethier has also offered many cogent criticisms of the standard model, without having 
any noticeable effect on its popularity; this is a mystery.) Before Ethier (on this topic) there was Arye 
Hillman and various co-authors, who plainly held the practitioners’ view of trade agreements, but 
whose models also seem not to have captured the practitioners’ story, and who also did not succeed in 
forestalling or dislodging the standard model.
8
 It might be suggested that the unsatisfactoriness of 
attempts to model the practitioners’ story indicate that it is incoherent. But in view of the story’s wide 
acceptance, such a conclusion seems premature. We need more attempts. 
There is no story about the workings of the standard model that is as familiar as the practitioners’ 
story. But there is a story, familiar to economists, about the simplest case under the standard model. 
Imagine two similar-sized countries, trading two goods, with national income-maximizing 
governments. Each country can benefit itself by imposing an appropriately chosen “optimum tariff”. 
The tariff reduces the country’s imports, and hence brings about a lower world price for those imports 
(it improves the country’s terms-of-trade); the country in effect collects some tariff revenue from 
foreign exporters (which I shall refer to as the “terms-of-trade tariff revenue”). The tariff will cause 
some deadweight loss in the local economy, but if the tariff is properly chosen, this loss will be 
outweighed by the terms-of-trade tariff revenue. So, both countries will impose optimum tariffs. But 
now, suppose the governments agree to eliminate these tariffs. Each government will lose the terms-
of-trade benefit of its own optimum tariff (the terms-of-trade tariff revenue), but it will no longer 
experience the terms-of-trade loss inflicted by its trading partner’s optimum tariff (experienced as 
reduced surplus earned by its exporters, which is a component of national income). In effect, each 
government hands back the tariff revenue it was collecting from foreign exporters. Because the 
countries are similar-sized, the transfers in both directions roughly cancel out; the agreement is 
approximately terms-of-trade neutral. But of course, when each government eliminates its optimum 
tariff, it also eliminates the domestic dead-weight loss from the tariff. So an agreement to eliminate the 
optimum tariffs makes each government better off; it allows each government to maintain the terms-
of-trade outcome it achieved by its unilateral optimum tariff, while avoiding the deadweight loss.
9
 I 
shall refer to this story about the simplest case under the standard model as the “optimum tariff 
story”.10  
If we compare the practitioners’ story and the optimum-tariff story, we see two fundamental 
differences. First, in the practitioners’ story, the unilateral tariffs are motivated by the desire for 
political support. The tariffs that the agreement reduces are protectionism.
11
 In contrast, in the 
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 Ethier (2011), pp. 311-314; (2007), pp. 618-620. 
8
 E.g., Hillman (1982); Hillman, Long, and Moser (1995); Hillman and Moser (1996). 
9
 If the countries are of different sizes, then an agreement to simply eliminate the optimum tariffs may not be terms-of-
trade neutral, and it may fail to make the larger country better off. But a supplemental international transfer payment can 
be found that will make the agreement terms-of-trade neutral; and an agreement that incorporates such a transfer payment 
will make both governments better off. It will preserve the terms-of-trade outcome each government achieved by its 
unilateral optimum tariff, while avoiding the domestic deadweight losses.  
10
 So far as I know, this story was introduced into the modern literature by Wolfgang Mayer (1981). Some people have been 
surprised that I do not attribute the story to Harry Johnson (1953-54). In earlier drafts, I did – I thought I remembered the 
story from Johnson (1953-54). But Gene Grossman pointed out to me that it was not there (and gave me the Mayer cite). 
Johnson (1953-54) is entirely about establishing that a country may be better off with an optimum tariff than in free trade, 
even if its trading partner retaliates; trade agreements are never mentioned. Harry Johnson (1965), p. 265, states the 
conclusion of the optimum tariff story, and plainly assumes that the readers all understand the story; but he does not spell 
it out. Incidentally, it seems likely that both Robert Torrens and John Stuart Mill, who certainly had the idea of optimum 
tariffs, also anticipated this explanation for trade agreements. See Humphrey (1987). 
11
 There is no reason why the practitioners’ story could not be expanded to allow for a trade agreement that also eliminates 
terms-of-trade manipulation, by essentially the mechanism of the optimum-tariff story; the practitioners’ story makes no 
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optimum-tariff story, the only motive that the national income-maximizing governments have for a 
tariff is the terms-of-trade motive. The tariffs that the agreement reduces are terms-of-trade 
manipulation. Second, in the practitioners’ story, getting the agreement depends on political support 
from export interests. But in the optimum-tariff story, there is no special-interest politics at all.
12
 
Of course both the Bagwell-Staiger model and the Grossman-Helpman model allow for the 
possibility that governments have political-support motives as well as terms-of-trade motives. So we 
cannot simply take it for granted that the optimum-tariff story is a fully adequate representation of the 
mechanism that produces trade agreements in the standard model. But in fact, it is, as I shall show in 
the rest of this section. First, both the Bagwell-Staiger model and the Grossman-Helpman model say 
that even when governments have political-support motives and engage in protectionism, a trade 
agreement will eliminate only the tariffs (or the parts of tariffs) that are motivated by terms-of-trade 
considerations – just what the agreement does in the optimum-tariff story. Second, we shall see that 
even when there is political motivation in the standard model, politics plays no role in explaining why 
we get an agreement. Again, just as in the optimum-tariff story.  
First, we explain why trade agreements address only terms-of-trade manipulation (and not 
protectionism) in the standard model. The mechanism is most clearly displayed in the Grossman-
Helpman model. Grossman and Helpman derive a formula for the unilateral tariff in Nash equilibrium, 
which is additively separable and has two terms. Grossman and Helpman say these terms reflect the 
“political support” and “terms-of-trade” motives, respectively.13 They point out that the formula for 
the “political support” term is just the formula they had derived in a previous article for the tariff that 
would be chosen by a small country facing fixed world prices.
14
 So the political support term 
represents the tariff that would be chosen by a large country, if it behaved as if the world price were 
fixed at its equilibrium level, or in other words, if it optimized with respect to domestic prices alone. 
And of course, the political support term includes the part of the tariff that is attributable to 
protectionism, as its name indicates.
15
 The “terms-of-trade” term in the formula for the unilateral tariff 
is just the classic expression for the optimum tariff. Notice incidentally that having an additively 
separable formula for the unilateral tariff allows us to see immediately that the government will 
always engage in terms-of-trade manipulation in this model. Grossman and Helpman also derive a 
formula for the tariffs that will be installed by an efficient trade agreement (always meaning efficient 
from the governments’ point of view);16 and one can see by inspection of this formula that an 
agreement that installed tariffs consisting of just the political support terms of the unilateral tariffs, 
without the terms-of-trade terms, would be efficient. So an efficient agreement strips out the parts of 
the tariffs that result from terms-of-trade manipulation, while leaving in place the parts that result from 
protectionism.
17
 
(Contd.)                                                                  
mention of terms-of-trade manipulation, because practitioners do not regard terms-of-trade manipulation as a significant 
phenomenon in the real world. It might seem that even a purely protectionist government must at least take note of the 
world-price effects of its protectionist tariff, in order to set the tariff at the right level. But taking note of world-price 
effects for this purpose is not the same as being motivated by them. Also, if import-competing producers reward the 
government on the basis of the tariff (not the domestic price), then it is the producers who have to think about the world-
price effects. 
12
 Of course, the benefit to exporters from the agreement plays an essential role in the optimum-tariff story; but the 
increased exporter surplus is valued only as a component of national income, balancing the national-income loss in tariff 
revenue. It gets no extra weight on political grounds. 
13
 Grossman and Helpman (1995), p. 688.  
14
 Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
15
 I say “includes”, because this term also takes account of producers’ lobbying over their consumer surplus, which 
hereafter I shall continue to ignore. 
16
 Grossman and Helpman (1995), p. 700. 
17
 The agreement that installs tariffs equal to the “political support” terms is not the only possible efficient agreement; and 
in some cases it may be necessary to bargain to some other efficient agreement to have an outcome that all parties prefer 
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When I say the agreement strips out the terms-of-trade manipulation and leaves the protectionism 
in place, I am not claiming that the cooperative tariffs take exactly the same values as the values of the 
political support terms at the Nash equilibrium (even though the formula is the same). World prices 
may change between the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria; and since the political support 
terms are evaluated at the equilibrium world prices, they may change as well. But the crucial point 
remains: in the cooperative tariffs, there is no terms-of-trade component, and the political motive 
operates without constraint, at the equilibrium world prices. In that sense, the agreement strips out 
terms-of-trade manipulation and leaves protectionism in place. 
Turning to the Bagwell-Staiger model, notice first that in this model, just as in the Grossman-
Helpman model, governments will always have, and act on, terms-of-trade motivation.
18
 But Bagwell 
and Staiger also consider hypothetically governments that do not act on the terms-of-trade motive. A 
government that ignores the terms-of-trade motive will optimize with regard to the domestic relative 
price, while in effect treating the world price as fixed at its equilibrium level. Taking a liberty with 
Bagwell and Staiger’s terminology, I shall call the tariff adopted by such a government the “politically 
optimal tariff”. (This is a liberty, because Bagwell and Staiger actually define the “politically optimal 
tariffs” only as the non-cooperative equilibrium tariffs that result when both governments behave this 
way.) The “politically optimal tariff” is the analogue, in the Bagwell-Staiger formalism, for the 
“political support” term in Grossman-Helpman; it represents the protectionist component in the 
unilateral tariff. Bagwell and Staiger prove that, when adopted by both governments, the politically 
optimal tariffs are efficient (from the governments’ point of view, of course). Bagwell and Staiger also 
prove that the Nash equilibrium tariffs, which reflect both the political and terms-of-trade motives, are 
higher than the politically optimal tariffs. So an efficient trade agreement reduces tariffs, moving us 
from the Nash equilibrium tariffs to the politically optimal tariffs. In other words, just as in Grossman-
Helpman, the agreement eliminates the part of the tariff that is motivated by terms-of-trade 
considerations, and it leaves in place the part of the tariff motivated by protectionist considerations.
19
 
The idea that a model (any model) could say trade agreements do not address protectionism will be 
very counterintuitive for most readers. To make it more intuitive, note that a protectionist tariff can be 
understood as a Pigovian tax that internalizes a negative consumption externality (from the 
government’s point of view) caused by the imported good. Each imported unit of the good displaces a 
domestically-produced unit, and lowers the import-competing producers’ profits, and thus costs the 
government a bit of political support. This is a negative effect on the government that consumers do 
not consider, and that the ordinary operation of the price mechanism does not internalize in the 
absence of a tariff. So, insofar as the tariff reflects only the government’s protectionist motive, it 
merely neutralizes this consumption externality. Hence protectionism is efficient, from the 
governments’ point of view.20  
(Contd.)                                                                  
to the Nash equilibrium. (Cf. note 9 supra.) But any efficient agreement must call for trade policies that in concert 
generate the same domestic prices in both countries, and the same trade flows, as the agreement I have singled out; any 
efficient outcome differs from this agreement only by an international transfer. We may think of this transfer as 
accomplished by cooperative terms-of-trade manipulation, by one or more tariff-subsidy pairs. So any efficient 
agreement can be thought of as stripping out the unilateral terms-of trade manipulation; and leaving protectionism in 
place; and then adding a transfer payment, which may of course be zero. Similar remarks apply to the Bagwell-Staiger 
model. 
18
 This follows from the bedrock assumption that the government’s welfare varies directly with the terms of trade (in their 
formalism, Wpw < 0). Bagwell and Staiger (1999), p. 220; (2002), p. 19.  
19
 Bagwell and Staiger (2002), pp. 23-25; (1999), pp. 221-224 (and remember the remarks on other efficient agreements in 
note 17 supra.)  
20
 At this point the reader may wonder, “If protectionist tariffs are efficient, why are they reduced in the practitioners’ 
story?” We have already hinted at the answer. In the practitioners’ story, as we explain in section 4, the mere fact of 
negotiating over an agreement changes the political forces on the government. So what was efficient before, and what is 
efficient in the standard model, is efficient no longer. 
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So far, we have seen that even when governments have political motives in the standard model, the 
trade agreement does just what it does in the optimum-tariff story: it eliminates (only) terms-of-trade 
manipulation. We turn now to showing that the mechanism by which we get an agreement in the 
standard model is the same as in the optimum-tariff story: even if governments have political motives, 
politics plays no role in securing the agreement. To begin, notice that Bagwell and Staiger’s 
“politically optimal tariffs”, which are defined as the tariffs that would be adopted in non-cooperative 
equilibrium by governments that ignore the terms-of-trade motive, are perfectly well-defined even for 
governments that have no political motives at all (in which case they, they are zero).
21
 The same is true 
of Grossman and Helpman’s “political support” terms.22 To avoid being misled about the role of 
politics by Bagwell and Staiger’s, and Grossman and Helpman’s, names for these tariffs or tariff terms 
(“politically-optimal tariffs”, “political support” terms), I shall rename them the “non-exploitive 
optimal tariffs”. So the “non-exploitive optimal tariffs” are defined as the non-cooperative tariffs that 
would be adopted by governments that ignore the terms-of-trade motive. This is just a renaming; but it 
makes it easier to see that the relevant concept applies equally, whether governments have political 
motives or not. In our new terminology, what we learned in the preceding paragraphs about the 
Bagwell-Staiger and Grossman-Helpman models is that the non-exploitive optimal tariffs are efficient.  
Next, I define the “net non-exploitive return” as the sum of all the benefits and costs to the home 
government of its tariff, but exclusive of the terms-of-trade benefit (or cost, in the case of an export 
subsidy). Once again, this definition of the “net non-exploitive return” applies equally, whether 
governments have political motives or not. If the government has political motives, then all the 
political benefits and political costs of the tariff are counted in the net non-exploitive return, along 
with the cost in domestic distortion; but if the government does not have political motives, the net non-
exploitive return is just the domestic distortion. Note that the net non-exploitive return is maximized at 
the non-exploitive optimal tariff.  
Now, to establish that politics plays no role in explaining why we get an agreement in the standard 
model, we give a perfectly general explanation for why we get an agreement, which makes no 
reference to politics at all. (The explanation will be easily recognized as a generalization of the 
optimum-tariff story.) In the standard model, rational governments always have, and act on, terms-of-
trade motives, which leads them to impose unilateral tariffs that are higher than the non-exploitive 
optimal tariffs. But for each government, the terms-of-trade benefit from having a tariff higher than 
the non-exploitive optimal tariff comes at the cost of a reduction in the net non-exploitive return 
(which is maximized at the non-exploitive optimal tariff). Suppose now that each government agrees 
to reduce its tariff to the non-exploitive optimal level. (This corresponds to giving up the optimum 
tariffs in the optimum-tariff story.) We already know such an agreement would be efficient. And if the 
countries are the same size, it would also be terms-of-trade neutral, so it would allow each government 
to secure the same terms-of-trade outcome it gets by its unilateral terms-of-trade manipulation, without 
the attendant reduction in its net non-exploitive return. So both governments can be made better off by 
the agreement. If the countries are not the same size, then we may need to supplement the move to the 
non-exploitive optimum with an international transfer, to make the agreement terms-of-trade neutral. 
But this again gives us an agreement that allows both governments to secure their non-cooperative 
terms-of-trade outcome, without the attendant reduction in their net non-exploitive return. So both are 
made better off. As promised, this is a straightforward generalization of the optimum-tariff story. 
We now have a perfectly general explanation of why there will be a trade agreement in the standard 
model, which makes no reference to politics. Unilateral terms-of-trade manipulation leads to a non-
cooperative equilibrium with tariffs higher than the non-exploitive optimum, and a terms-of-trade 
neutral agreement that eliminates the terms-of-trade manipulation then moves us to the (efficient) non-
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exploitive optimum. If political motivation is present, it is taken into account in calculating the net 
non-exploitive return and the non-exploitive optimal tariffs. So politics helps to determine the terms of 
the agreement. But the explanation for why there will be an agreement is exactly the same, whether the 
governments have political motives or not. And note that the fundamental description of the terms of 
the agreement as the non-exploitive optimal tariffs is also exactly the same, whether the governments 
have political motives or not. For understanding the agreement, the politics is epiphenomenal.
23
  
3. Denying the Contradiction Between the Practitioners’ Story and the Standard Model  
We now have two stories, both plausible, which contradict each other. The practitioners’ story claims 
that a trade agreement can reduce protectionism; the standard model claims it cannot. As we shall see 
in section 4, once we squarely confront the contradiction, it is not difficult to find the reasons for it. 
But people seem reluctant to confront the contradiction. Even the architects of the standard model 
sometimes argue that their model can explain trade agreements that address protectionism. In this 
section, I examine some of those arguments and explain where they go wrong. The fact that they are 
made at all confirms the deep-rooted appeal of the practitioners’ story, and the near impossibility of 
actually believing the standard model. 
3.1 Is the practitioners’ story just a specific case under the standard model?  
Staiger and Alan Sykes have written: “For Regan, the goal of trade agreements is to eliminate 
protectionism. But why do governments care about protection imposed by other governments? In our 
view, the answer lies in the fact that their exporters are harmed, and earn less on their export sales than 
otherwise. This is precisely the injury that terms-of-trade theory captures”.24 But, contrary to Staiger 
and Sykes’s claim, the injury from protectionism is not “precisely the injury that terms-of-trade theory 
captures”, assuming that by “terms-of-trade theory” they refer to the standard model. In the standard 
model, trade agreements do not reduce protectionism; hence they do not reduce the injury from 
protectionism. 
It is true that in the practitioners’ story, the reason Home cares about Foreign’s protectionism is 
that it harms Home’s exporters by reducing the world price of their exports (and thus Home can get 
political support from its exporters for negotiating down Foreign’s protectionism). The injury 
Foreign’s protectionism imposes on Home is mediated through the terms of trade; in that respect, it is 
like the injury that Foreign’s terms-of-trade manipulation imposes in the standard model. Even so, in 
the standard model a trade agreement will eliminate Foreign’s terms-of-trade manipulation (along 
with Home’s), and it will not reduce Foreign’s protectionism (nor Home’s). So the injury from 
Foreign’s protectionism, even though it is an injury mediated through the terms of trade, is not “the 
injury that terms-of-trade theory captures”. In other words, the so-called “terms-of-trade theory” does 
not capture all “terms-of-trade injury”. The practitioners’ story, in which trade agreements reduce 
protectionism, is not a special case of the standard model.
25
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 It is worth explaining concretely why getting an agreement in the standard model does not require mobilizing exporter 
support (as it does in the practitioners’ story). Suppose import-competing producers are organized, and exporters are not. 
There will be a loss in political support from the import-competing producers when we move to the non-exploitive 
optimum; but that loss is more than compensated for just by the reduction in the domestic deadweight loss, because 
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24
 Staiger and Sykes (2009), p. 31. 
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Bagwell and Staiger make the same error when discussing Cordell Hull’s thinking behind the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.
26
 Hull’s reason for wanting reciprocal liberalization was to 
mobilize exporter support for trade agreements; and Bagwell and Staiger point out that exporters 
would benefit because of the improved world price for their exports when the foreign tariff was 
lowered. True enough. But then Bagwell and Staiger say this shows that Hull’s story can be 
represented in their own framework. This does not follow. We have just explained one reason why it 
does not follow: the tariffs Hull meant to reduce by his agreements, and did reduce, were protectionist 
tariffs,
27
 and in Bagwell and Staiger’s framework, trade agreements that reduce protectionist tariffs are 
impossible. A second reason is that in Hull’s story, exporter politics plays a crucial role in securing an 
agreement. But we saw in section 2 that in the standard model, politics plays no role at all in 
explaining why we get an agreement. More specifically, in the standard model, we get an agreement 
even when import-competing producers organize and exporters do not.
28
  
Incidentally, Bagwell and Staiger also misstate the role of reciprocity in the practitioners’ story, 
when they say, “the ability of reciprocity to neutralize the adverse terms-of-trade implications of 
unilateral liberalization is the essence of [Cordell Hull’s story]” as well as of their own story.29 In 
Hull’s story, which is to say the practitioners’ story, the government is not motivated by terms-of-trade 
advantage when it imposes its tariff, and hence its objection to unilateral liberalization is not the terms-
of-trade loss. Rather, its objection is the loss of the political support from import-competing producers 
that it sought when it imposed the tariff. And the benefit it seeks from its trading partner’s 
liberalization is not the terms-of-trade improvement as such, but the political support from exporters 
that that improvement brings. 
3.2 Does the standard model allow agreements that reduce protectionism after all?  
Grossman and Henrik Horn have written a paper for the American Law Institute’s project on WTO 
law that is meant to explain the economics of trade agreements to lawyers.
30
 In the paper, Grossman 
and Horn say repeatedly that a large country’s unilateral trade policy creates international 
inefficiencies that call for a trade agreement regardless of the country’s objectives. Thus: “In our view, 
the fundamental rationale for the GATT is to help governments avoid externalities from unilateral 
determination of policies. These externalities arise when governments reduce import demand in order 
to achieve their domestic policy objectives.”31 “[T]he reason why governments prefer to invoke trade 
barriers is not important.”32 “The more fundamental problem caused by unilateral tariff setting is that 
governments reduce trade volumes in order to achieve their objectives, whatever they may be.”33 
These quotes suggest that even pure protectionism creates the grounds for a trade agreement. But 
Grossman and Horn give no explanation of how a trade agreement can reduce protectionism. As we 
shall see, the only explanation they give for trade agreements is the standard model, in which the 
agreement will not address protectionism.  
There is a sense in which Grossman and Horn are right that, in their model, there will be a trade 
agreement whatever the government’s purpose. In their model, the government will always act on the 
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 Bagwell and Staiger (2002), p. 63. Cf. Bagwell and Staiger (1999), p. 227, n. 20. 
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 See note 23 supra. 
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 Bagwell and Staiger (2002), p. 63. 
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terms-of-trade motive, whatever other objects the government may or may not have;
34
 and this terms-
of-trade manipulation will always provide the grounds for a trade agreement. But the statements 
quoted in the previous paragraph seem to suggest that protectionism by itself would give rise to a trade 
agreement, which is a different claim, and inconsistent with their model. 
Grossman and Horn appear to offer two explanations for trade agreements; but the explanations are 
in fact the same, and they are both the standard model. Section 4 of their paper sets out what they refer 
to as the “National Market Power Model”, which is straightforwardly the standard model. Grossman 
and Horn first explain the traditional optimum tariff for a national income-maximizing country;
35
 then 
they explain why such an optimum tariff is globally inefficient, and they give the optimum-tariff 
explanation for a trade agreement between two countries with optimum tariffs;
36
 then, citing Bagwell 
and Staiger, they point out that even if governments have political motives and engage in 
protectionism, they will still also “exploit national market power”, and so “fundamentally the same 
explanation for the existence of trade agreements” applies as with national income-maximizing 
governments.
37
 Here Grossman and Horn are explicit that the explanation for the trade agreement 
depends on the fact that the governments engage in terms-of-trade manipulation (whether or not they 
also engage in protectionism).  
Section 3 of Grossman and Horn sets out an “International Externalities Model” of trade 
agreements. Grossman and Horn appear to suggest that this model is more general. But we shall see 
that even in this model, the authors implicitly assume that governments engage in terms-of-trade 
manipulation, and they explain only why there will be an agreement to eliminate that; there is no 
explanation of how an agreement could eliminate protectionism. First, Grossman and Horn impose 
three assumptions about each government’s objective function: (1) starting from a zero tariff, the 
government has an incentive to raise the tariff; (2) as Home’s tariff is gradually increased, with 
Foreign’s tariff held constant, Home’s welfare first increases and then declines; (3) Home is always 
hurt by an increase in Foreign’s tariff.38 Next, they expound the concepts of a best response function 
and a Nash equilibrium, and they give a diagrammatic explanation of why a trade agreement can make 
both countries better off than in the Nash equilibrium.
39
 They also give a very brief “mathematics-in-
words” explanation. They explain that, starting from the Nash equilibrium, “A small change in the 
Home tariff would reduce the Home government’s welfare only slightly (because a near-optimal 
choice yields almost the same welfare as an optimal choice), but would provide clear political gains to 
the Foreign government. [And similarly, mutatis mutandis, for a small change in Foreign’s tariff.]”40 
This is a solid argument, but on analysis it turns out to be just a new version of the familiar argument 
that terms-of-trade manipulation will create the occasion for a trade agreement. Grossman and Horn’s 
assumptions guarantee that the governments will engage in terms-of-trade manipulation. To see why, 
notice first that their assumption (3) tells us two things: it tells us that each country is large; and it also 
tells us that each government’s welfare function depends directly on the terms of trade. Also, by 
definition, in the Nash equilibrium each government optimizes. (Grossman and Horn rely on that fact 
when they say that a small change in Home’s tariff has a negligible effect on Home’s welfare.) But if 
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some country is large, so that the government can affect the terms of trade; and if the government’s 
welfare function depends directly on the terms of trade; and if the government optimizes; then the 
government will necessarily engage in terms-of-trade manipulation. So what Grossman and Horn 
prove in their section 3 is still just the familiar proposition that when governments engage in terms-of-
trade manipulation, there is room for a trade agreement. Their argument suggests no reason to think 
that the trade agreement will do anything more than eliminate the terms-of-trade manipulation. This is 
still the standard model. 
Grossman and Horn also describe a concrete example in which they claim that a trade agreement 
will reduce protectionism. But the example does not work. Grossman and Horn consider what happens 
in the Grossman-Helpman model if (a) the government puts a zero weight on social welfare and cares 
only about its campaign contributions, and (b) special interest groups constitute only a negligibly 
small proportion of the population and hence receive only a negligible fraction of the tariff revenue, so 
that they do not lobby over tariff revenue. As Grossman and Horn say: “In this case, governments will 
choose their tariffs solely in view of the campaign contributions they are offered, which will in turn be 
based on the protection that special interests gain from tariffs and not on the revenues that are 
generated.” Grossman and Horn claim that even in this situation, where the tariffs are pure 
protectionism, the tariffs will still be inefficiently high, and there will be a trade agreement.
41
 But in 
fact, if we set the parameters of the Grossman-Helpman model to reflect assumptions (a) and (b), the 
unilateral tariffs and the tariffs required by an efficient agreement become either infinite or 
indeterminate (depending on whether the relevant sector is organized or not).
42
 So we cannot make 
assumptions (a) and (b) concurrently without going beyond the domain of the Grossman-Helpman 
model. This is another route to our previous conclusion, that there must always be terms-of-trade 
manipulation in the model, which explains the trade agreement. Grossman and Horn have given no 
explanation of how a trade agreement might reduce protectionism, either in the Grossman-Helpman 
model, or on their own general approach. 
4. Accounting for the Difference Between the Practitioners’ Story and the Standard 
Model  
Once one confronts squarely the fact that the practitioners’ story and the standard model say very 
different things about trade agreements, it is not hard to explain the difference. The practitioners’ story 
and the standard model make different assumptions about which producer groups lobby in which 
contexts, and for what; and they also make different assumptions about what favors governments are 
willing to provide.  
The practitioners’ story treats exporters as inert in the non-cooperative context. Exporters rouse 
themselves only to lobby in favor of some proposed trade agreement. Of course proponents of the 
practitioners’ story are aware that in the real world, some exporters lobby for and even secure 
unilateral export subsidies. But that is not a problem, as long as there are some exporter groups that do 
not lobby (or do not lobby successfully) in the non-cooperative context, but who would lobby for a 
trade agreement. Those are the groups that are necessary for the practitioners’ story to produce a trade 
agreement. 
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The standard model, in contrast, assumes that any exporters who would lobby in the cooperative 
context for a trade agreement also lobby in the non-cooperative context.
43
 In the Grossman-Helpman 
model, they lobby for export subsidies. In the Bagwell-Staiger model, they lobby against a tariff. But 
of course, their lobbying against a tariff in the Bagwell-Staiger model could in principle result in an 
import subsidy, which would be equivalent to an export subsidy in this two-good model. So we can 
regard exporters in the Bagwell-Staiger model either as lobbying against a tariff or as lobbying for an 
export subsidy, and we shall adopt both perspectives in our discussion below.  
Both versions of the standard model share another important assumption. They assume that 
governments make no distinction between the fiscal cost of benefitting exporters through a trade 
agreement (which takes the form of tariff revenue foregone) and the fiscal cost of benefitting exporters 
through a subsidy (which takes the form of out-of-pocket expenditure). This assumption is at odds 
with the practitioners’ conventional wisdom, which assumes governments will be less willing to spend 
on subsidies than to give up tariff revenue. 
So, the practitioners’ story and the standard model make different assumptions, both about who 
lobbies when and for what, and about the government’s willingness to respond in various ways. These 
assumptions explain the different conclusions about whether trade agreements will reduce 
protectionism. In the standard model, any exporters who would lobby for a trade agreement also lobby 
in the non-cooperative context, and the government is as willing to benefit them by subsidies as by a 
trade agreement. As a consequence, it turns out that whatever the government would have been willing 
to do for these exporters by making a trade agreement, it will already have done for them by unilateral 
tariff-reductions or subsidies. There will simply be nothing left for a trade agreement to do on the 
political front (which is why the trade agreement will address terms-of-trade manipulation, but not 
protectionism). In contrast, in the practitioners’ story, there are at least some exporters who lobby (or 
who lobby successfully) only in the cooperative context. So the political forces for liberalization are 
not fully active in the non-cooperative context, and the political forces for protection are effectively 
over-represented in that context. That is why an agreement will reduce protectionism.
44
 
Which account of trade agreements makes the more plausible assumptions? The argument for the 
assumptions of the standard model is simple: the behavior the standard model assumes is required of 
informed and rational agents, whether exporters or governments. It would be irrational for exporters 
who would lobby for a trade agreement not to lobby for unilateral policies that would secure 
equivalent benefits for themselves. And it would be irrational for a government to distinguish between 
tariff revenue foregone and out-of-pocket expenditure on subsidies, since they are both just reductions 
in the fiscal balance.  
And yet, most people, both practitioners and economists in their informal thinking, implicitly 
assume that some exporters are active only when an agreement is under discussion. Why might that 
be? Let us start with an issue that is not the most important, but is a convenient point of entry. In the 
Bagwell-Staiger model, exporters lobby against tariffs in the unilateral context. Bagwell and Staiger 
have argued that to assume otherwise is to assume exporters cannot be brought to understand Lerner 
equivalence.
45
 But if we look at the real world, we don’t seem to see many exporters lobbying against 
tariffs. Jagdish Bhagwati has written, concerning the proposition that protectionism damages 
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exporters: “[I]t is not uncommon to find trained economists who fail to grasp the relationship. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that export interests have not generally been mobilized in opposition to import-
competing industries’ demands for protection.”46 Even if exporters do grasp the relationship, there can 
still be reasons for them not to lobby against unilateral tariffs. As Wilfred Ethier has pointed out, in a 
world with many goods, exporters can know in principle that their own government’s tariffs hurt 
exports, without knowing in practice just how much any particular tariff harms exports of any 
particular good. So no exporter group knows how much it should pay for what reductions in which 
home tariffs. In contrast, exporters can see just how they will be benefited by a reduction in Foreign’s 
tariff on their product.
47
 Robert Hudec also observed that exporters mostly do not lobby against tariffs, 
but he offers yet a third explanation: “It is often very bad public relations to oppose a fellow citizen’s 
petition for help from his/her government when there is no visible direct interest at stake.” In effect, 
each producer group treats trade policies as primarily the business of the producers directly affected; 
so even though exporters are indirectly affected by tariffs, they treat tariffs as not really their business, 
and they leave lobbying over tariffs to import-competing producer groups. But Hudec goes on to note 
that exporter groups can lobby for trade agreements, because then they are not just lobbying against 
their own country’s tariffs; they are lobbying for a reduction in foreign tariffs, which will affect them 
directly.
48
  
This raises the question of why the practitioners’ story implicitly assumes that (at least) some 
exporters do not lobby for export subsidies, which also affect them directly. One possible answer is 
that most exporters do not lobby for export subsidies, because they think they are unlikely to get them. 
Arthur Dunkel and Frieder Roessler, discussing a different but related issue, have suggested that 
governments are reluctant to offer production subsidies to import-competing industries as an 
alternative to tariffs because of the expenditure involved, even when the subsidy would be more 
efficient.
49
 This example is specially significant, because the subsidy Dunkel and Roessler were 
considering does not have the terms-of-trade cost associated with an export subsidy. (A production 
subsidy for an import-competing industry would improve the terms of trade.) So the example suggests 
by extension that even a government that is not concerned with the terms-of-trade cost of an export 
subsidy might still be reluctant to help exporters by that means. For a different example, consider that 
in a purely domestic context, it is usually easier for an interest group to get a subsidy in the form of a 
tax expenditure than to get the same subsidy by an explicit transfer. This would appear as irrationality 
on the part of the government in any formal model that looks only at the balance in the treasury. But it 
may not be irrational at all (from the government’s point of view) in a larger political and cultural 
context. For example, the government may prefer the tax expenditure because it is a less transparent 
mechanism for conferring focused benefits; or it may prefer it because the tax expenditure can be sold 
in some quarters as a tax cut; or because using the tax expenditure mechanism reduces the overall 
budget, even though it does not affect the balance. 
There may be other reasons of political culture why export subsidies seem so much less popular 
than tariffs as an instrument of politically-motivated trade policy. For example, there is a tendency in 
the general political culture to understand trade relations through the metaphor of a war for markets. In 
this war, tariffs are defensive weapons, holding the home territory for its natural occupants, domestic 
producers. In contrast, export subsidies are offensive weapons, seeking to annex foreign market 
territory. In the modern world, we are suspicious of invaders, even when the invaders are us. The 
international trade community seems to share this bias. The GATT/WTO has never proposed to 
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eliminate tariffs completely, even though it attempts to reduce them. Export subsidies, in contrast, are 
absolutely prohibited by the WTO,
50
 and they were strongly discouraged even in the GATT.
51
  
The last three paragraphs are far removed from any formal model. But considerations of political 
culture are real, even when they are amorphous. They may account for behavior by governments or 
exporters that would be irrational in the standard model, or in any familiar sort of model. They may 
explain why that behavior is perfectly rational in the context of real world politics. 
Our discussion strongly suggests that the governments’ reluctance to grant export subsidies is the 
reason, or an important reason, why we need a trade agreement to reduce protectionism. Wilfred 
Ethier has produced a model that confirms the basic idea here, although in his model the government 
is not unwilling to benefit exporters by export subsidies, but is unable to do so because of its trading 
partner’s countervailing duty [CVD] laws.52 This is a good story. It is not obviously the practitioners’ 
story, which makes no mention of CVD laws. But of course, the practitioners’ story in itself gives no 
other reason for the limited use of export subsidies, so this might be as good a way of expanding it as 
any. Ethier is dissatisfied with the fact that his model works only if we assume away terms-of-trade 
motivation completely,
53
 but that might be no stumbling block for most believers in the practitioners’ 
story. For myself, I suspect the political culture considerations are at least as important as foreign 
CVD laws in explaining why exporters are not fully served by unilateral policy. But no one, including 
proponents of the practitioners’ story, has focused sufficiently on these issues.  
In sum, the assumptions of the standard model have the advantage of abstract rationality (and 
concomitant ease of modeling), but the assumptions of the practitioners’ story seem more plausible as 
a description of the real world. 
5. Does the Standard Model Explain Trade Agreements? 
There is much about actual trade agreements that the standard model cannot explain. In section 5.2 
below, I will identify a number of specific features of existing agreements that the model cannot 
explain. But first, in section 5.1, we look at a broader failure. The standard model does not provide a 
plausible explanation of why there are trade agreements at all.  
5.1 Does the standard model explain the existence of trade agreements?  
According to the standard model, trade agreements are about eliminating terms-of-trade manipulation. 
So the model cannot be taken to explain trade agreements unless countries actually engage in terms-
of-trade manipulation, or would do so except for existing trade agreements that constrain them. The 
evidence suggests that countries do not, and would not, engage in terms-of-trade manipulation (or 
certainly not to the extent necessary to explain existing trade agreements).  
For a start, the standard rhetoric of trade makes virtually no reference to terms-of-trade 
manipulation, neither as a policy that countries adopt, nor as a problem for trade agreements to solve. 
(In contrast, the rhetoric abounds with discussion of protectionism, and the desirability of reducing 
protectionism by trade agreements.) Bagwell and Staiger acknowledge that practitioners do not talk 
about terms-of-trade manipulation, and that this casts doubt on the practical relevance of their model. 
In response, they point out that practitioners talk a great deal about market access. So, to defend the 
relevance of their model, Bagwell and Staiger argue that “we may interpret [. . .] ‘terms-of-trade gain’ 
                                                     
50
 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Art. 3.1(a). 
51
 GATT Art. XVI, Section B. 
52
 Ethier (2011), pp. 311-314; (2007), pp. 618-620. 
53
 Ethier (2007), p. 618. 
Explaining Trade Agreements: The Practitioners’ Story and the Standard Model 
15 
and ‘market-access restriction’ as [. . . ] phrases that describe the single economic experience that 
occurs when the domestic government raises its import tariff and restricts foreign access to its 
market.”54  
This defense of their model, suggesting that “market-access restriction” and “terms-of-trade gain” 
are equivalent concepts, misses the mark. It is true that if we focus on the effects of a tariff, market 
access restriction and terms-of-trade gain go hand in hand. And it is also true (as we saw in section 
3.1) that when Home, as a demandeur in trade negotiations, seeks to help its exporters by securing 
greater access to Foreign’s market, it can be thought of as seeking improved terms of trade. But 
neither of these propositions is relevant to the question that is crucial for Bagwell and Staiger, the 
question of whether governments engage in terms-of-trade manipulation. That is a question about 
governments’ motivation for imposing tariffs. And once we focus on the motivation (not effects) for 
unilateral policy (not negotiation), market access restriction and terms-of-trade gain are not 
equivalent. Purely protectionist tariffs aim at restricting market access, in order to raise the domestic 
price; but by definition, purely protectionist tariffs do not aim at terms-of-trade gain, even though a 
terms-of-trade gain will result. In fact, the terms-of-trade gain works against the achievement of the 
protectionist goal of raising the domestic price. Ceteris paribus, the reduction of the world price of the 
import good lowers the domestic price, just the opposite of what the government wants. So although 
the purely protectionist government is aiming at market access restriction to raise the domestic price, 
and it incidentally achieves a terms-of-trade gain, it definitely is not aiming at the terms-of-trade gain. 
Bagwell and Staiger’s claimed equivalence between market-access restriction and terms-of-trade gain 
breaks down when we are considering how non-cooperative tariffs are motivated. In other words, it 
breaks down exactly where it matters for Bagwell and Staiger’s attempt to defend their model against 
doubts that countries engage in terms-of-trade manipulation. Pointing out the universal concern with 
market access therefore tells us nothing about whether governments manipulate their terms of trade. 
Bagwell and Staiger have another response to the objection that governments do not talk about the 
terms of trade. They remind us that governments that do not talk about the terms of trade, and even 
governments that never think in those terms, might nonetheless be making decisions by some 
procedure that has the operative effect of terms-of-trade manipulation. But notice that governments 
cannot be manipulating the terms of trade, even unconsciously, if they pay no attention to tariff 
revenue in their decision-making. Tariff revenue is where the benefit of terms-of-trade manipulation 
(by tariff-setting) shows up.
55
 If we can take the United States as representative of the large, developed 
countries that have been the drivers of trade negotiation (at least until very recently), then such 
countries have not engaged in terms-of-trade manipulation. In the classic studies of United States trade 
policy from the Hawley-Smoot period to the present, there is not one word to suggest that tariffs were 
ever motivated in even the slightest degree by the desire for tariff revenue (whether to be deposited in 
the treasury or distributed to the citizenry).
56
 Which means that during the past eighty-odd years, the 
United States has not engaged in terms-of-trade manipulation, not even when it was unconstrained by 
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 Bagwell and Staiger (2002), pp. 28-29. For simplicity, I have omitted Bagwell and Staiger’s references to “cost shifting”, 
which they list as a third equivalent. The treatment of cost shifting would be the same as the treatment of terms-of-trade 
gain. Unlike market-access restriction, cost shifting is equivalent to terms-of-trade gain in all contexts. 
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 Cf. Ethier (2007), p. 611. 
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told by former staffers in relevant Congressional offices that no one thinks about the tariff revenue when considering 
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any trade agreements. The history is clear that even when United States tariffs were at their highest, 
they were pure protectionism.
57
  
We can also find direct behavioral evidence of the weakness or absence of the terms-of-trade 
motive by considering the instruments of unilateral trade policy that governments employ. There are 
some widely-used trade policy instruments that may, in principle, reflect either protectionism or terms-
of-trade manipulation, tariffs being the most obvious example. But there are also many commonly-
used instruments that can only be motivated by protectionism, because they damage the home 
country’s terms of trade, such as voluntary export restraints [VER’s] sought by the importing country, 
or import quotas assigned in a way that allows the exporters to collect the quota rents. Also, in those 
cases where export subsidies are granted, the motivation must be political (although not 
“protectionism” as we have defined it), since export subsidies damage the home country’s terms-of-
trade.
58
 Conversely, there is no commonly used trade instrument that causes a political-support loss 
and hence must be motivated by terms-of-trade gain. Export taxes are relatively rare; and the few 
export taxes we see are usually protectionism for domestic consumers or users of the good in question. 
In sum, there is little or no actual trade behavior from which we can infer that terms-of-trade 
motivation must be operative. And even if terms-of-trade motivation is operative to some degree, the 
common use of instruments like VER’s that buy political gain at the cost of terms-of-trade loss, and 
the rarity of instruments like export taxes that buy terms-of-trade gain at a political cost, show that the 
terms-of-trade motive must be very weak compared to the protectionist motive.  
In an important recent paper, Broda, Limão, and Weinstein purport to demonstrate by an 
econometric analysis that countries engage in terms-of-trade manipulation in tariff-setting.
59
 They 
argue that there is a correlation between market power and tariff levels, both across countries and 
across goods within countries. But even if this is true, we cannot infer that countries engage in terms-
of-trade manipulation. To be sure, the correlations Broda, Limão, and Weinstein identify would appear 
in the tariffs of countries engaged in terms-of-trade manipulation. But they could also very plausibly 
appear in the tariffs of countries motivated solely by protectionism. If the government has a purely 
politically- determined target for the domestic price of the import good, established without reference 
to its market power, then the tariff will still be correlated with market power, because greater market 
power means that a higher tariff is required to achieve any particular price for domestic producers. 
Given that we have abundant other evidence of protectionism, and no other evidence for terms-of-
trade manipulation, we should not infer terms-of-trade manipulation from this study.
60
 
Essentially the same point applies to a recent paper by Bagwell and Staiger.
61
 They point out that 
on their model of trade agreements, “trade negotiations should cut tariffs the most on those products 
and for those countries where the international cost-shifting motives under unilateral tariff-setting are 
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greatest.”62 And they then present empirical evidence that they say provides “strong and robust 
support” for this prediction.63 But as with the Broda, Limão, Weinstein study, the empirical evidence 
Bagwell and Staiger present seems equally consistent with the practitioners’ story. The cases where 
the “cost-shifting motives . . . are greatest” are cases where Home has greatest market power, and 
substantial import volume. But these are also the cases where a purely protectionist tariff by Home 
imposes the greatest harm on Foreign’s exporters in achieving any particular domestic price for 
Home’s import-competing producers. So they are the cases where it should be easiest for purely 
protectionist governments to find an agreement that allows each side to replace support from import-
competing producers with support from exporters, as in the practitioners’ story. Just as with the Broda, 
Limão, Weinstein paper, Bagwell and Staiger’s evidence appears to be as consistent with a world of 
purely protectionist governments as with a world of terms-of-trade manipulators. 
In sum, we have empirical evidence that market power matters to tariff levels, both unilateral tariff 
levels (Broda, Limão, and Weinstein) and negotiated tariff levels (Bagwell and Staiger). But 
intuitively, the practitioners’ story accounts for that just as well as the standard model.64 
The econometric studies fail to discriminate between the possibility that governments are terms-of-
trade manipulators and the possibility that they are purely protectionist. But we have seen other 
evidence that does discriminate, both behavioral evidence (facts about the use of various instruments 
of trade policy) and reportorial evidence (the histories that suggest no role for tariff revenue in policy 
choice). This evidence tells us that the terms-of-trade motive is either weak, or absent. Hence trade 
agreements must be about something other than terms-of-trade manipulation.
 
 
5.2 Does the standard model explain the particular features of the WTO? 
I have argued that the standard model does not explain the existence of trade agreements. We can also 
focus the argument on particular features of trade agreements. If we consider the WTO, there are many 
features that make no sense if we imagine the agreement is solely about terms-of-trade manipulation, 
but that make perfect sense if the agreement is about reducing protectionism. Because I have discussed 
these points elsewhere,
65
 I will provide no more here than a summary. Some features, of course, make 
sense whether the agreement is about terms-of-trade manipulation or protectionism: GATT Article II 
on “Schedules of Concessions”, for example. But other features make sense only if the agreement 
aims at reducing protectionism, because the targeted behaviors cannot be terms-of-trade manipulation: 
for example, the prohibition of VER’s induced by the importing country; the prohibition in GATT 
Article XI of complete import and export embargoes and of import quotas that are assigned to foreign 
exporters without charge; and the prohibition of export subsidies. In contrast, there are no features of 
the agreement that can only be explained by a concern with terms-of-trade manipulation. Furthermore, 
there are many places where the WTO passes up chances to restrain terms-of-trade manipulation, 
suggesting that any worry about terms-of-trade manipulation must be limited at best: for example, the 
lack of any constraint on export taxes; the fact that GATT Article III forbids only discriminatory 
internal measures (since non-discriminatory internal measures can be used for terms-of-trade 
manipulation, even though they cannot be protectionism); and the requirement of injury to the 
domestic import-competing industry in the Safeguards Agreement. In sum, analogously to our survey 
of unilateral trade behavior, we find some features of the agreements that could be designed to restrain 
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either protectionism or terms-of-trade manipulation; some features that make sense only in an 
agreement aimed at protectionism; and some features that indicate the absence of any strong concern 
with terms-of-trade manipulation. We find no features that require us to think the agreement is 
concerned with terms-of-trade manipulation to any degree. The standard model does not explain the 
agreements we actually have. 
6. Why It Matters Which Explanation of Trade Agreements Is Correct 
Understanding correctly what an efficient trade agreement will do is essential to intelligent treaty 
design. If the standard model is correct in saying that an efficient trade agreement will address only 
terms-of-trade manipulation, then every instance in section 5.2 of a feature of the WTO agreement that 
cannot be explained on these grounds is in fact a design flaw, and should be changed. We should have 
no ban on VER’s induced by the importing country; no prohibition of complete import or export 
embargoes, or of quotas simply assigned to foreign countries without payment; no prohibition of 
export subsidies; and so on. Furthermore, if we are genuinely worried about terms-of-trade 
manipulation, we should restrain export taxes; we should have no injury requirement in the Safeguards 
Agreement; we should have more disciplines on non-discriminatory internal regulation; and so on. 
On the other hand, if the practitioners’ view is correct, and the standard model is wrong, then it would 
be a disaster for trade negotiators to accept and be guided by the standard model. They would no 
longer maintain existing limits on protectionism or seek to impose new limits, and the world would 
lose the primary benefit that trade agreements bring. Or consider the effect if the WTO Appellate 
Body accepted the standard model. If they were reviewing some measure for WTO-consistency, in a 
context where they needed to interpret the relevant treaty provision in light of the treaty’s purpose, 
they could find themselves arguing: “We think this measure was motivated by protectionism. 
Therefore, as the standard model tells us, it is not the sort of measure the treaty was designed to 
restrain. Therefore it is legal.” I trust that sounds as wrong to most readers as it does to me. 
At present, there seems to be no danger that trade negotiators and adjudicators will abandon the 
practitioners’ story for the standard model. The standard model has been around for twenty years, 
without affecting the practitioners’ belief that trade agreements are about reducing protectionism. Still, 
it is worth reminding ourselves of the gulf that separates the practitioners’ story and the standard 
model, as a precautionary measure. Also, if more economists confronted squarely the inconsistency 
between the practitioners’ story and the standard model, we might get formal models of the 
practitioners’ story that lead to unpredictable new insights, with practical import for the negotiation 
process and for treaty interpretation. In any event, just understanding better a phenomenon as 
important as trade agreements is valuable in itself.
66
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